Pop Bioethics » Cloning

A Clone of My Own, Ctd.

Kyle Munkittrick — Thu, 06 May 2010 18:33:45 +0000

The poor cloning debate has turned into a thoroughly-beaten dead horse and yet, here I find myself, brandishing a fresh cudgel and eying the rhetorical equestrian corpse for some worthy target. Let me begin by doing something people rarely do when debating issues like this: state what I am actually defending.

I, Kyle Munkittrick, believe that cloning is a method of reproduction that will fall under the rubric of assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) and current animals produced by cloning show mutations and complications from the genetic level up through basic body shape and size. Based on lessons learned from previous ARTs, such as IVF, standards for deeming cloning a “safe” method of reproduction must be significantly higher and more rigorous before it is an option for human reproduction. Once safe, however, cloning has no ethical complications and should be legal for any parent who wishes to clone their child to be able to do so. Claims of damage to society, to parent-child relations, or to fundamental child psychology are all erroneous, particularly in the context of our current society’s diversity of family structures, methods of reproduction (both natural and ART), and flexible understanding of parenthood.

My response is to Adam Keiper and Ari Schulman of The New Atlantis and its blog Futurisms. Their posts “Clone Knowns and Unknowns” and “Attack of the Cloners” are sufficiently representative to be used as general examples of bioconservative argumentation methods as well as ethical positions. There are arguments that neither Keiper nor Schulman make, such as the Kassian “yuck” factor argument or the concern of “playing God,” which, given the utter baseless nature of those arguments, is understandable. Beginning with Schulman’s post, I will take their arguments point by point.

1. Reproductive Equivalence:

Schulman first quotes my assertion that cloning is merely another means of reproduction. My point in that quotation is that there is nothing unique about cloning ethically per se regarding either genetics or method from current techniques. The huge diversity of family formations and massive changes in parent-child role throughout the 20th century have largely undermined the significance of actual genetic relationship. Schulman attempts to refute the first point with a second quotation in which I challenge the line “But our genetic uniqueness is an important source of our sense of who we are and how we regard ourselves” as authored by the President’s Council on Bioethics. I end my challenge with the question of who still identifies with their genetics in that way. Schulman uses Caplan’s own statement as an answer: “I want to experience the sublime bond I’m sure we’d share. I’m confident that he’d be delighted, too, because I would love to be raised by me.” Thus, if I’m reading it correctly, Schulman is arguing a) I assert that genetics doesn’t make a difference re: reproduction and that b) we don’t identify with our genetics, but my defense of Caplan is undermined because of c) Caplan identifies with his genetics, therefore arguments A and B are undermined. The clincher is that the threat of cloning as seen by the PCB is that the cloned child would have to live in the shadow of the parent, which Caplan seems to confirm.

Schulman does not actually refute either the point that cloning isn’t significantly different from other ARTs or methods of reproduction in general (therefore I see that as a point in my column) or the point that we do not generally identify with our genetics (I do not twist the PCB’s language and Schulman provides no alternate interpretation). His argument is based on the assumption that Caplan is identifying with his genetics and, therefore, Caplan’s statement provides the evidence necessary to undermine my claim that we don’t identify with genetics, which in turn undermines my claim that cloning is insufficiently different from other ARTs to merit concern.

There are two responses. The first is that Caplan is a genetic determinist and wants to raise his clone to be just like him. In this case, one would merely reply by stating that Caplan’s motives for cloning and his understanding of how genetics work is faulty, but that his statement does not undermine my points A and B; no where in my arguments did I rely on Caplan’s construction or portrayal of cloning, but was in fact defending cloning in general, which would falsify his statement in addition to Keiper and the PCB’s arguments, not my own. However, I do not believe Caplan is a determinist or that his thoughts are to be construed the way Schulman intends. Given that a) Caplan has twin children, he intimately understands genes do not determine an individual b) Caplan at no point says that the sublime bond is due to the child being a result of cloning or that it would be anymore sublime than his bond with his current children and c) the statement “I would love to be raised by me” can apply to any child he has. Furthermore, for anyone who reads Caplan regularly, the tongue-in-cheek nature of point C would be evident.

Schulman’s effort to show contradiction among my own points in defense of cloning as well as with Caplan’s falls apart under scrutiny.

2. A Sober Look at Assisted Reproduction

Schulman first quotes Cheryl Miller’s “Donated Generation” piece which quotes Elizabeth Marquardt’s statements about the child psychology of donor based children. The quotation is meant to make it look like these weird family situations somehow harm the child’s psychological and social development. Susan Golombok, Fiona MacCallum, and Emma Goodman’s research in “The Test Tube Generation: Parent-Child Relationships and the Well-Being of In Vitro Fertilization Children at Adolescence” (Child Development, March 2001, Vol 72.) and “Families with Children Conceived by Donor Insemination: A Follow-Up at Age Twelve” (Child Development, May/June, 2002 Vol. 73) both conclude that though there are changes in family dynamic and understanding of “parents” all the children were psychologically and socially well-adjusted as well as or better than control groups.

Schulman italicizes the final line of Miller’s quotation “If biology matters to parents, Marquardt asks, why wouldn’t it also matter to children?” Schulman extends this logic to Caplan, noting that if Caplan prefers a clone to other methods of reproduction, then genetics must matter. Here I offer no disagreement. Caplan’s reasons don’t make much sense if one looks at things logically. Of course, by logical standards most people should adopt: there are too many orphans, pregnancy is difficult and expensive (more so if ARTs are involved), and it helps society overall. Yet most don’t, because reproduction is an extremely personal decision. Schulman’s attempt at pop-psychology by reading into a single paragraph by Caplan as to the exact reasons for why he wants a clone and, furthermore, what it says about cloning in general and how Caplan runs his family is preposterous.

The suggestion that Caplan would raise the cloned child alone or without his wife’s consent remains unfounded and pointless to debate. Just because Caplan doesn’t say “my wife and I want a clone” and “I would love to be raised by my wife and me” doesn’t mean it isn’t implied. The onus of the assumption is still Schulman and Keiper’s, not Caplan’s.

3. The Unbearable Lightness of Cloning

Schulman, presuming his shoddy argumentation has actually achieved something resembling a point, proceeds to act as if my statements remain in tension with themselves and with Caplan’s argument. Schulman then makes a statement about transhumanist arguments in general that displays his genuine ignorance of how or why this debate is being conducted:

The underlying pattern is to describe the potentially novel good of some new enhancement, but then rebuff potential criticism of that good by claiming that the enhancement actually won’t be very different from anything we already have.

Schulman, prick up your ears my good sir, and listen. The “novel good of some new enhancement” is a qualitative improvement in a person’s life or in a particular activity – such as being able to prevent a disease, improve relationships, or create another option for reproduction – while the “claiming that the enhancement actually won’t be different from anything we already have” is regarding its ethical relationship to the status quo. A condom is ethically no different than birth control or a vasectomy, but all three of those have qualitative differences. If I introduced a new method of birth control that was qualitatively better in all ways than these three combined, it would be a “novel good” that is ethically no different from the previous technologies, as the intent to prevent pregnancy and disease while allowing intercourse remains unchanged.

On to Keiper

1. Safety

I have no disagreement with Keiper here. IVF was insufficiently tested and clinical trials did not reveal problems that are now being discovered. Cloning needs significantly higher standards of safety and more rigorous testing before general usage is deemed acceptable.

2. You Don’t Hate Children, Do You?

Keiper claims my statement that bioconservatives perpetuate and entrench the very stigmas they say will cause psychological trauma for cloned children is risible. Glad I gave you ~~T n’ A~~ TNA (snicker) folks a chuckle. Keiper says I am co-opting civil rights language, though I don’t see how defending a group of people as being equal to other people isn’t a civil rights issue, but anyway. Ok fine, you don’t think clones are inherently lesser, that doesn’t undermine my point. Let’s go to the tape.

Keiper states “When the critics of biotechnologies, especially new reproductive techniques, try to understand and explain the moral problems involved in those technologies, it is with the aim of preserving human dignity.” In addition, he states that “The debate over cloning is about changing the nature of procreation, and about the profound effects of that change.” So, Keiper and Schulman’s concern with cloning is that it harms the dignity of a cloned human, uh, somehow. I never quite get that connection made clearly for me. Here again, we see the same error made by Schulman, except in reverse. Keiper’s concern about the “profound effects of that change” sees a huge ethical and tries to use qualitative difference as evidence, but can’t muster either one. If cloning is unsafe, well, unsafe medical procedures are wrong in general. Cloning changes the relationship between parents and children in lots of ways, but none of which are unique to cloning. Maybe it’s the amount of planning that goes into the child makes it feel different, a la Habermas? But then parents who waited till they were financially sound and used birth control would have the same psychological effect. Similarity to another person? All kids live in their parents or a relative’s shadow, twins have the most difficult possible scenario and are fine. I don’t see the problem here.

I find it interesting that Keiper only disagrees with my argumentative construction; he offers no critique of cloning nor does he explain, exactly, how it violates human dignity. Neither he nor Schulman actually engage my rebuttals to their arguments against cloning. While they’re busy (incorrectly) criticizing my (awesome, flawless, Apollonian) technique, I’m winning the debate as to whether or not cloning itself is ethical. I have a stack of articles and books waiting to back me up, gentlemen, so feel free to fire a return salvo at your leisure.

Clone Wars

Kyle Munkittrick — Sat, 01 May 2010 18:28:43 +0000

Oooooh! I provoked a response. The chaps over at Futurisms have made some rebuttals. I’m sure they’re great and I promise to read them, but right now I’m flipping burgers up on the roof in the Brooklyn sun. I’ll deal with Mr. Keiper‘s and Mr. Schulman‘s arguments when it’s raining and miserable on Monday.

If Only It Were This Easy

Kyle Munkittrick — Fri, 23 Apr 2010 02:28:37 +0000

One of my favorite commercials, to lighten the mood:

A Clone of My Own

Kyle Munkittrick — Thu, 22 Apr 2010 14:13:45 +0000

Futurama already covered the clone existential crisis, of course.

Bryan Caplan sure knows how to market a book. With one polemic paragraph, Caplan has managed to get a host of blogs to write about his upcoming book Selfish Reasons to Have More Kids. The offending clump of words:

I confess that I take anti-cloning arguments personally. Not only do they insult the identical twin sons I already have; they insult a son I hope I live to meet. Yes, I wish to clone myself and raise the baby as my son. Seriously. I want to experience the sublime bond I’m sure we’d share. I’m confident that he’d be delighted, too, because I would love to be raised by me. I’m not pushing others to clone themselves. I’m not asking anyone else to pay for my dream. I just want government to leave me and the cloning business alone. Is that too much to ask?

There are three levels of this argument. The first is that anti-cloning arguments insult identical twins. The second is that a cloned child is desirable and would be cherished. The third is that the right to clone oneself should a matter of reproductive choice, the government need not get involved. That said, I’d like to note that Bryan Caplan never uses the word “clone” as a noun or a pronoun for potential son. A cloned child is a child conceived and gestated through the means of cloning, but that child is no more a “clone” than a child born of IVF is a “test tube baby.” It’s pejorative language.

I responded briefly to most of the simplistic arguments of the commenters on Marginal Revolution yesterday, but thankfully TNA’s (I laugh every time I write that abbreviation) Adam Keiper offered a more complex rebuttal on the Futurisms blog. Before I get into that, I’d like to talk just for a moment about Steve Sailer‘s response to Caplan. Sailer’s argument can be summarized thus: Arrogant narcissists want to clone themselves because they are arrogant narcissists, and we know they are arrogant narcissists because they want to clone themselves; Two things result from Caplan’s arrogant narcissism – he doesn’t ask his wife if she wants to raise another kid (misogynist!) and the cloned child will be as arrogant and narcissistic as the father (Freud!), making things frustrating (Lacan!). Is that perfectly clear? Sailer’s case against cloning hinges on the personality of the person who wants a cloned child; he makes no “cloning is immoral” argument per se, merely that Caplan himself is confused as to how “sublime” raising a cloned child would be.

If a person is neither narcissistic or arrogant, but still wants a clone, then Sailer’s case is refuted. Let’s do a thought experiment. Let’s say that Bryan Caplan doesn’t want to clone himself, just another child, but his wife, Corina, wants a clone of him as their next child. Her reasons are her own and I need not conjecture. Now it’s easy to say Bryan Caplan is an arrogant narcissist: he is a blogger and a professor. To call Corina Caplan arrogant and narcissist is difficult, because by Sailer’s own logic, she couldn’t get along with Bryan let alone have ever gotten married. So in this thought experiment, let’s assume Bryan is just arrogant and narcissistic enough to be a professor and a blogger, but not to want to be cloned, while Corina is well matched personality-wise to enjoy the company of mildly arrogant and narcissistic individuals. Furthermore, let’s go way out on a limb and assume that Bryan, who clearly takes a significant interest in his family and his children, does not treat his wife as chattel and they share family and household responsibility 50/50. Suddenly, the cloned child is in a situation where the mother wants and knows how to handle him, the father helps plenty and isn’t strong headed enough to cause problems anymore significant than a normal family, and POOF, there goes Sailer’s case.

I know that might be mindblowing to you, Mr. Sailer, but what is misogynistic is not Bryan’s lack of “consulting his wife” which is presumed in this day and age, but the fact that you, Mr. Sailer, presume that Bryan’s wife will be dealing with most of the results.

FURTHERMORE, a cloned child is still their child. The point Cowen was making by bringing up adoption and genetics percentages was an effort to show that our society is ok with variation in genetic relationship to parents. To somehow assume that a clone of Bryan Caplan would be “Bryan’s” child while the other kids were both Bryan and Corina’s is vulgar and preposterous. Cloning is a method of reproduction just like IVF and PGD and rutting in the back seat and the rhythm method. If Mrs. Caplan carried the cloned child to term, he would have Mrs. Caplan’s mitochondrial DNA and would imprint on her, not to mention that the child would have an utterly different environment, family situation, and nurturing conditions. I don’t know why so many neoconservatives are simultaneously genetic determinists and ostensible meritocratists. /rant.

In short: Sailer makes no arguments against cloning, merely against the Caplans’ reproductive rational. His points are based on conjecture and circular logic. Moving on.

Adam Keiper’s more delicious post actually makes arguments against cloning proper. Here we come into the second strange paradox of the neoconservative logic – the impacts of social construction and societal pressure are always important, but god forbid we try to alter the sources. Keiper quotes, at length, from the Presidential Council on Bioethics, best known for its landmark tome of finger-wagging, arm-crossing, and head-shaking: Beyond Therapy. Keiper is actually citing an essay in Bioethics from the PCB, but the language and logic is the same. A taste, and please note that in the following are assertions there is no explaination of how or why these things are so:

Of course, our genetic makeup does not by itself determine our identities. But our genetic uniqueness is an important source of our sense of who we are and how we regard ourselves. It is an emblem of independence and individuality. It endows us with a sense of life as a never-before-enacted possibility. Knowing and feeling that nobody has previously possessed our particular gift of natural characteristics, we go forward as genetically unique individuals into relatively indeterminate futures.

We haven’t had a grasp on genetics, particularly not on a social level, until this century, and even then not much till the ’70s. I am almost certain that human beings were endowed with a “sense of life” and “never-before-enacted possibility” before Mendel, Watson, Crick, and Collins, but I might be wrong! Do you see how these arguments work? The PCB asserts a reality and we nod our heads accordingly, then they say new technology X violates the ineffable, ethereal reality they’ve constructed. Where is the evidence people identify with their genetics? Anyone? Habermas? C.S. Lewis? Fukuyama? Anyone wanna show me some evidence of anybody but the goddamned monarchy system and American political dynasties (Kennedy, Bush) who care that much about genetics? The above paragraph from the PCB is so demonstrably false as to be comedic. And just so you know the PCB isn’t a bunch of insensitive jerks, they explain why identical twins don’t count in their calculus:

It may reasonably be argued that genetic individuality is not an indispensable human good, since identical twins share a common genotype and seem not to be harmed by it. But this argument misses the context and environment into which even a single human clone would be born. Identical twins have as progenitors two biological parents and are born together, before either one has developed and shown what his or her potential — natural or otherwise — may be. Each is largely free of the burden of measuring up to or even knowing in advance the genetic traits of the other, because both begin life together and neither is yet known to the world. But a clone is a genetic near-copy of a person who is already living or has already lived.

So let me get this straight: An identical twin, who has the same birthday, same parents, same neighborhood, same friend group, same native language, same historical period, same socio-economic status, same religion, same womb as his or her twin is less constricted in his or her life decisions than a cloned child with different all-of-the-above. For real? Does anyone really believe a cloned child would have anymore perceived pressure to live up to their parent’s standard than any other child does? I thought the Oedipus complex was some sort of basic, universal aspect of development, but according to the PCB, it is unique to clones, those poor saps. Are you beginning to see how reductionist and preposterous these arguments are?

I’ve already rambled on for too long, so let me get to the most important points. First, cloning is a method of reproduction, where in the percentages of DNA are different in the child than they would be from unassisted reproduction. IVF, adoption, surrogate parenting, and egg/sperm donation all also alter the genetic make up of the child from unassisted reproduction and produce no ill effects on parent/child relation. Second, identical twins have orders of magnitude more social pressure to either be like or be different from their twin and have the genetic, nurture, and environmental deck stacked against their becoming individuals, yet they invariably do, in fact, become different people. Third, anytime a bioconservative argues that a cloned child would be subject to exceptional prejudice, pressures, or perceptions which would be detrimental to that child, remember that it is by and large bioconservatives who perpetuate the idea that a cloned child is determined by its genetics, suggest that a cloned child would/should be perceived as lesser than a “normal” child, and help fan the very social stigmas about which they worry. I too, worry about the social pressures and normative stigmas against children born via cloning, and so I work to break and uproot the biases and dogmas that nourish them. I do not use stigmas and social pressures as a kind of “it would be too hard for a cloned child, so shouldn’t we ban the creation of the little abominations” argument.

Cloning is a method of reproduction, a cloned child is not determined by its genetics any more or less than an identical twin, and if a social dogma is a problem you remove the dogma not the victim.

Bryan Caplan Wants A Clone

Kyle Munkittrick — Wed, 21 Apr 2010 13:34:30 +0000

Tyler Cowen goads his readership with this paragraph from Caplan:

I confess that I take anti-cloning arguments personally. Not only do they insult the identical twin sons I already have; they insult a son I hope I live to meet. Yes, I wish to clone myself and raise the baby as my son. Seriously. I want to experience the sublime bond I’m sure we’d share. I’m confident that he’d be delighted, too, because I would love to be raised by me. I’m not pushing others to clone themselves. I’m not asking anyone else to pay for my dream. I just want government to leave me and the cloning business alone. Is that too much to ask?

Then, Cowen being Cowen, he asks his readers to share their thoughts as to why or why not cloning should be allowed. MR is known for having an impressive readership, but the vast majority of comments boiled down to simplistic and poorly constructed arguments. Anti-cloning arguments as drawn from the MR thread can be reduced to the following:

1. Yuk! a la Leon Kass, this is not a rational argument, but in fact is supported by the instinctual revulsion to the concept.

2. Caplan, as a stand in for anyone who wants a clone, is arrogant, vain, and an egomaniac.

These first two points aren’t even arguments, just gut reactions with no warrant.

3. Cloning reduces genetic diversity.

4. Cloning will be psychologically harmful to the child.

5. Cloning will be physically harmful to the child.

6. Cloning will complicate legal/domestic situations.

None of these cases hold water.

3a. Cloning no more alters genetic diversity than having twins does. Issues of genetic diversity would only arise if most births were of the same clone, not if lots and lots of different people each had clones. A population of 50,000 is sufficient for genetic diversity.

3b. It is reasonable to assume that a society in which cloning is perfected would have some degree of genetic engineering. If cloning is possible, then genetic safeties and enhancements are likely possible, further negating problems of diversity.

4a. Being a twin is not psychologically harmful. No precedent.

4b. Any child raised in a neglectful, abusive, or manipulative household will be traumatized. There is no evidence that a cloned child would be any more subject to these problems than any other. Given the extra and deliberate steps necessary to create a clone, one might argue the child would be more wanted and cherished, therefore in an above average situation.

4c. The primary threat of psychological trauma comes from outside the family, among those who used arguments (1) and (2) to argue that cloning is inherently wrong. Those individuals who are disgusted by cloning would be the very people who would damage the child’s psyche through indirect insults, questioning the child’s humanity, and general revulsion.

5a. No sane proponent of cloning (and Caplan is quite sane) advocates the process if it is unsafe. Animal testing must be thorough, rigorous, and successes conclusive and easily repeatable. As with any other process, such as IVF, there will be risks early on, but those risks must first be at or below the level of standard, unassisted pregnancy before experiments on humans are even considered.

5b. Safe, successful cloning would, by definition, have no complications or affects on the child of note. If this is the case, cloning is no more physically dangerous than being a twin.

6a. Identity is not determined by genetics, identical twins prove this. The law would be no different than it is for identical twins. The clone would have a new social security number, new birth certificate, and the rest of the grid (school enrollment, passport number, drivers license, etc) would fall into place, entrenching and reinforcing the individual identity of that person, just as it does for all of us.

6b. Issues of “raising oneself” or “falling in love again with the clone of one’s wife” or abusing one’s clone as “masturbation” demonstrate not problems of cloning but the various strains of pathology running through the minds of commenters. Most of us have a friend who looks “just like” their parent did at a given age, with similar quirks, interests, physical affectations and behaviors. No one would make the above arguments in the later case. Gross oversimplification of psychology and parent/child relationships is required to even consider these points. I often am at a loss to address these arguments because they require such a demented and pathological view of humanity I feel there is no hope of convincing those who believe them.

There is one real moral objection to cloning: right now, cloning is an unproven and verifiably dangerous process. The chances of the child not coming to term at all, being born fatally deformed or under-developed, having life shortening and worsening complications, and/or being developmentally disabled are so high as to make it a crime to attempt to clone now. Only a few clones of any species exist in the world currently. Until the process is proven safe, reliable, and to have no more risk of complications than “natural” reproduction among non-human species, it would and will be a moral violation to even begin experimenting with human cloning. The process is so new, I suspect Caplan will not live to see a world in which cloning is safe enough for him to reproduce that way. But when the technology is ready and safe, then there is no reasonable moral or ethical case for prohibition of the process.

Defending Cloning from Kass

Kyle Munkittrick — Mon, 14 Dec 2009 14:41:22 +0000

Daily Dish contributor Patrick Appel took note of Bryan Caplan’s critique of Leon Kass. Appel, wary of cloning, was naturally swayed by Kass’ argument against cloning that would cause “pain and suffering” to early test clones. I responded via email and Appel (who apparently doesn’t like Kass much either) took my points under consideration and posted it on the Dish:

It’s a shame you agree with Leon Kass on anything, let alone his arguments against cloning. When you say you’d feel differently if “cloning no more dangerous than natural reproduction,” it makes me suspicious you have a rose-tinted view of the process. People often assume much lower rates of miscarriage and birth defects, thereby giving a false impression that natural reproduction is already a “safe” behavior. In reality, it’s the best version we have so far. Any bioethicist with a shred of decency argues that human cloning should obviously not occur until it is proven not just as safe as, but safer than natural pregnancy among animal test subjects. Natural processes are akin to Churchill’s perspective on democracy: it’s the worst form reproduction except for every other that has been tried. Cloning requires an intimate knowledge of natural processes. In fact, it requires such complex and nuanced understanding that the research required to create a successful, completely healthy clone of any kind would provide scientists with the knowledge necessary to make reproduction of all forms safer.

Yes, human cloning should not even be attempted until the mechanisms are understood and it can be done with a very high degree of safety. But that is not what Caplan is critiquing when he picks apart Kass’ argument. Kass uses the spaghetti method, tossing fist fulls of arguments at the wall until something sticks. For some people it is his repugnance argument (which Caplan dismantles) that connects, while for others, like yourself, its the “pain and suffering argument.” This latter argument sounds like a reasonable critique to cloning until one realizes that it is a legitimate critique for any medical procedure. It is why the FDA exists and why scientists go through phased testing, to minimize pain and suffering at all costs while still moving forward with a beneficial and useful procedure. To presume cloning would somehow be exempt is naive. In all likelihood, the whole situation is a false threat anyway. The benefits of cloning someone exactly are small, while the benefits of the knowledge acquired while learning how to clone someone exactly are enormous. Organ transplants, genetic engineering, stem cells and a host of other branches of medical research are watching the progress made in cloning hoping for research that can be cross-applied.

I suggest you pick up a copy of Ronald Bailey’s Liberation Biology. A less developed version of the argument he makes in the book appears here.

One of the best parts about the blogosphere is the dialogue. Yes it’s all a bit ADD, but it’s also instantaneous feedback. If you’re actually interested in learning and thinking, there are few better forums for idea exchange. The Dish has helped me see the other side of so many issues, it’s a treat to be able to return the favor.

Also, I really wish I proof read my ~~emails, blog posts~~ writing a bit better. My grammar often suffers for the sake of my arguments.

The Venture Bros. & Clones

Kyle Munkittrick — Tue, 24 Nov 2009 16:04:32 +0000

The Venture Bros. is one of those shows I don’t really laugh out loud at until the third or forth time I watch an episode. It isn’t because the jokes aren’t hilarious the first time, it’s just that there is so much awesome compressed into every moment I don’t have time to laugh. ~~“The Grand Inquisitor”~~ “Twenty Years to Midnight” is one of the few exclusions: the Grand Galactic Inquisitor’s ridiculous interjections still make me tear up from laughing so hard. My larger point is that there is so much going on in any given episode, some stuff can get lost in the mix.

One long narrative thread that gets drawn from the first episode of season 2 all the way to the end of season 3 is that the boys, Hank and Dean, can be cloned when they die. Their beds record their memories, so the clones have almost no memory break between death and waking up the next morning. A classic ethical problem of cloning technology has always been “would the clone be a new person or the same one?” There are two versions of the answer to the metaphysical/ontological aspect of this question: the religious and the secular answers.

In the religious version, the answer is that the soul cannot continue on, despite the “memories” being implanted in the new cloned substrate. Basically this results in a soulless zombie thing that is not the same person. So the answer is no.

In the secular version, the answer is that the original person really did die, so his or her consciousness is no longer continuous, meaning he or she is gone. The clone, despite having the same memories and not perceiving a gap in time, thus having a contiguous conscious experience, is still a different person. Again, we come to the answer of no.

Normally, this would be a bit of a problem, as The Venture Bros. is a show watched by nerds who undoubtedly would have figured out this conundrum and become upset that their favorite characters were now, well, not the same as the ones from the first season (despite that the Hank and Dean from the first season were also clones, but nerds are good at cherry picking when we’re being cranky). But, you see, thanks to the metaphysical footwork of Dr. Orpheus, the Venture’s necromancer neighbor, getting into an argument with Venture, we’re presented with a strange workaround to the problem of a clones’ consciousness.

Orpheus, guilt-ridden that he was a terrible babysitter and let the boys die, seeks to find their souls in the underworld. After a failed search, he realizes the boys’ souls are “trapped” in a machine. Dr. Venture starts arguing with Orpheus that the mumbo-jumbo about “souls” and “resurrection” is no different from using clone slugs and recorded memories. The strange implication of all of this is, when we accept the rules of the Venture world for a moment, are actually forced to agree with Venture in that Orpheus detects the souls of the boys in the computer storing their memories.

Thus, the resolution that Jason Publick and Doc Hammer come up with is: your soul is your memories, can be stored for future usage and ultimately put into a new body. The religious and secular problems are overcome.

Ok ok, I know this isn’t exactly a rigorous philosophical or theological examination of the implications of clones with implanted memories. I think Moon probably does a better job of handling that than The Venture Bros. But it is the only effort I’ve seen to combine the secular and religious argument and, in the process, reverse the conclusion of both. Oh, and it means we get the “aborted clone desperate to live up to the original” episode to boot. Everybody wins.